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Recent Decisions
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT
HATFILL V. NEW YORK TIMES CO.: FROM WATCHDOG TO
ATTACK DOG—TRANSFORMING THE MODERN
MEDIA INTO “BIG BROTHER”
WILLIAM C. FERGUSON IV*
In Hatfill v. New York Times Co. (Hatfill III),1 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit relied upon an expansive application of the limited-purpose public figure doctrine to dismiss a
defamation claim against a major media organization.2 The Hatfill III
court broadly interpreted the relevant “particular public controversy”
by misapplying the Fourth Circuit’s established two-part inquiry for
cases involving a defamation-plaintiff’s qualification as a limited-purpose public figure.3 By doing so, the Hatfill III court threatened private citizens’ ability to succeed with defamation claims in the future
when plaintiffs bring claims against the mainstream media for news
content relating to national security.4 A strict application of the
Fourth Circuit’s two-part inquiry, including a strict examination of the
particular public controversy giving rise to the defamatory statements
and a derivative use of the Fitzgerald test,5 would have been more in
line with Circuit precedent and would have avoided an overly expansive application of the limited-purpose public figure doctrine.6
Copyright  2009 by William C. Ferguson IV.
* William C. Ferguson IV is a second-year law student at the University of Maryland
School of Law and is a staff member for the Maryland Law Review. The author would like to
thank Professor Leigh Maddox for overseeing the writing process and Lea Smith for providing insightful consultation. The author also would like to thank fellow Maryland Law
Review members and editors Emily Chase Dubansky and Heather R. Pruger.
1. 532 F.3d 312 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 765 (2008).
2. See infra Part III.
3. See infra Part IV.A.
4. See infra Part IV.B.
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
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I. THE CASE
Twice during the weeks just after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, an unknown person mailed envelopes laced with the
deadly toxin anthrax to several members of the United States Congress and to the offices of several media outlets.7 As a result of the
anthrax attacks, five people who had handled the poisoned envelopes
died, Congress closed legislative sessions, and the United States Postal
Service experienced significant disruptions.8 The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”) responded to the national security threat by initiating an investigation into all possible domestic and international
suspects.9 During the investigation, but before any arrests had been
made in the case, Dr. Steven Hatfill (“Hatfill”), a former biochemical
weapons expert and private advisor for the United States government,
became a subject of the investigation.10
From May 2002 through August 2002, Nicholas Kristof (“Kristof”), a regular opinion editorial (“op-ed”) columnist for The New York
Times (“the Times”), wrote a series of five articles that harshly criticized
the FBI’s “‘lackadaisical’” and “‘unbelievably lethargic’” anthrax investigations.11 The columnist suggested that the FBI was leaving the
7. Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill III), 532 F.3d 312, 315 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S.
Ct. 765 (2008).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id. (referencing five New York Times articles that presented evidence of Hatfill’s
potential involvement in the attacks). Hatfill had significant experience in the field of
infectious diseases and bioterrorism research. Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill II), 488 F.
Supp. 2d 522, 524 (E.D. Va. 2007), aff’d, 532 F.3d 312 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 765
(2008). After studying infectious diseases abroad, Hatfill began work in bioterrorism research while employed by the United States for work with the National Institutes of Health
(“NIH”), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”), and the United State
Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (“USAMRIID”). Id. at 524. Hatfill
soon became a recognized expert in the field, and he consulted with the Defense Intelligence Agency (“DIA”), the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”),
and various other government institutions. Id. at 525. While working for the NIH at the
Fort Detrick Army Base in Maryland, Hatfill came in contact with anthrax through his
research on biochemical warfare, and he was vaccinated against anthrax infections. Hatfill
III, 532 F.3d at 325. Throughout this time period, Hatfill frequently attempted to publicize
the country’s need to take greater preparations to protect against threats of bioterrorism.
Id. at 320–21. Additionally, Hatfill served as a relatively frequent commentator in media
reports focusing on bioterrorism, and before and after the 2001 anthrax attacks he appeared in publications and had contact with various media outlets, such as Insight magazine, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Times, CNN, The New York Times, and National Public
Radio, among others. Id. at 321–22.
11. Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 315 (quoting Nicholas D. Kristof, Anthrax? The F.B.I. Yawns,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002, at A21); accord Nicholas D. Kristof, The Anthrax Files, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 2002, at A19 (describing the FBI’s investigation of Hatfill as evidence of the
agency’s failures).
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United States unsafe and exposed to future bioterrorist threats by not
moving swiftly to identify the likely perpetrators.12 Specifically, Kristof
detailed information he had gathered from confidential sources to argue that FBI officials were not pursuing Hatfill satisfactorily.13
Through each of the five editorials in the Times, Kristof increasingly
exposed various aspects of Hatfill’s professional history and connections to the study of biochemical warfare, namely Hatfill’s well-known
focus on the use of anthrax in bioterrorism.14 While suggesting that
Hatfill had sufficient technical training, access, and motive to commit
the 2001 anthrax attacks, Kristof wrote that the FBI’s slow investigation of Hatfill contributed to the nation’s overall unpreparedness
against future threats of bioterrorism.15
Throughout the FBI’s investigation and the media’s suggestion
that Hatfill had a hand in the anthrax attacks, the researcher maintained his innocence and decried attempts to impugn his reputation.16 Twice, Hatfill held press conferences to refute facts that
implicated his involvement in the crimes, and he appeared on television, radio, and in print after the attacks to defend his innocence.17
On July 13, 2004, Hatfill filed a three-count lawsuit against Kristof
and the Times in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.18 Hatfill’s suit sounded in claims of defamation, defa12. Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 315; see Nicholas D. Kristof, Connecting Deadly Dots, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 2002, at A25 (citing the FBI’s faltering anthrax investigation as evidence of the
government’s inability to address increased security concerns sufficiently).
13. See Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill I), 416 F.3d 320, 325–28 (4th Cir. 2005). Kristof did not mention Hatfill by name until his fifth and final column. Id. at 327. Prior to
the fifth article, Kristof continually detailed the profile of a “Mr. Z,” a pseudonym for the
person who Kristof claimed the FBI was failing to pursue effectively. Id. at 324–25. In his
fifth editorial regarding the 2001 anthrax attacks, Kristof noted that he was revealing
Hatfill as “Mr. Z” only after Hatfill had appeared on television to deny media attacks implying that Hatfill was the anthrax perpetrator. Id. at 327 (quoting Kristof, The Anthrax Files,
supra note 11). But see Joel Mowbray, Hatfill Strikes Back, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Aug. 26, 2002,
http://www.nationalreview.com/mowbray/mowbray082602.asp (suggesting that Kristof actually fueled the FBI’s escalated investigation of Hatfill).
14. Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 315.
15. Id. at 315–16.
16. Id. at 321–22.
17. Id. at 322.
18. Hatfill I, 416 F.3d at 328–29. Hatfill’s filing in federal court was not his first lawsuit
against the Times. Id. at 328. On June 18, 2003, Hatfill filed a $1 million defamation suit
against Kristof and the Times in Virginia state court. Id. However, Hatfill took a voluntary
nonsuit when he failed to serve the defendants. Id. In Hatfill’s 2004 federal court case, the
Times and Kristof successfully argued that Hatfill’s second allegation of defamation per se
was time-barred by Virginia state law. Id. at 329. On appeal, however, the court reversed
and remanded this decision, holding that Hatfill’s voluntary nonsuit in the Virginia state
court tolled the statute of limitations on the defamation per se claims. Id. at 335.

R
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mation per se, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.19 The
district court dismissed all three counts under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).20 The district court held as a matter of law that
Kristof’s editorial columns were not defamatory because they merely
reported on the FBI’s investigation into Hatfill’s involvement while
avoiding ever actually accusing Hatfill of perpetrating the anthrax attacks.21 Hatfill appealed the lower court’s decision to the Fourth Circuit claiming that the district judge improperly dismissed the case
before discovery could take place.22
The Fourth Circuit found error in all three of the trial court’s
rulings and reversed and remanded the entire case to proceed to discovery.23 The Fourth Circuit held that under Virginia’s defamation
laws and with the facts taken as alleged by Hatfill’s complaint, a court
could reasonably find that Kristof or the Times had acted maliciously
when accusing Hatfill of a crime involving “moral turpitude,” thereby
precluding dismissal of Hatfill’s defamation claim under Rule
12(b)(6).24 In dissent, Judge Niemeyer agreed with the trial judge’s
decision, arguing that Kristof’s articles were not actionable under Virginia law because the columnist never actually accused Hatfill of committing a crime.25
On remand to the Eastern District of Virginia, the court held that
Hatfill’s experience and exposure related to the nation’s bioterrorism
security threats qualified Hatfill as a public official and as a public
figure for both general and limited-purposes under the five-factor Fitzgerald test26 commonly used in Fourth Circuit defamation cases.27 Accordingly, the trial judge found that Hatfill was required to show
through clear and convincing evidence that Kristof acted with “actual
malice” when publishing the articles involving Hatfill’s potential in19. Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill II), 488 F. Supp. 2d 522, 524 (E.D. Va. 2007), aff’d,
532 F.3d 312 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 765 (2008).
20. Hatfill I, 416 F.3d at 329.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 324, 334, 335, 337.
24. Id. at 334.
25. See id. at 338 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that reports of individual’s suspicious activity do not necessarily “amount to an accusation of criminal conduct”).
26. Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 691 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 1982); see also infra
Part II.B.
27. See Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill II), 488 F. Supp. 2d 522, 528 (E.D. Va. 2007)
(“In this case, [Hatfill] qualifies as a public official both in fact and in appearance. . . .
Even if [Hatfill] were not worthy of ‘public official’ status, the Court finds that Plaintiff
qualifies as a ‘public figure.’” (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345, 351
(1973))), aff’d, 532 F.3d 312 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 765 (2008).
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volvement in the anthrax attacks.28 Because the trial court found that
no malice existed and that Kristof based his written assertions on an
actual, reasonable belief that Hatfill was the prime suspect in the FBI’s
case, the court dismissed the entire case on summary judgment.29
Hatfill appealed once again to the Fourth Circuit, and the court heard
oral arguments on the defamation exceptions for cases involving public officials, general-purpose public figures, and limited-purpose public figures.30
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Defamation law’s limited-purpose public figure exception doctrine derives from the Supreme Court of the United States’ “actual
malice” standard, first announced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.31
The Court later clarified the “actual malice” standard for use in cases
including public figures.32 The Fourth Circuit has developed a framework for applying the doctrine,33 and has refined application of the
limited-purpose public figure doctrine through use of a two-part
inquiry.34
A. The New York Times Standard: Requiring Defamation Plaintiffs to
Show “Actual Malice” When Qualifying as Public Officials or
Public Figures
1. New York Times: Early Developments of the “Actual Malice”
Standard
The Supreme Court created the “actual malice” standard to protect media organizations’ expansive freedom of the press under the
First Amendment in the landmark decision of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.35 During the heart of the 1960s civil rights era, L.B. Sullivan,
one of three elected Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama, who oversaw the county departments protecting public safety,
filed a defamation claim against the Times.36 Sullivan claimed that the
Times unlawfully published a full-page advertisement that wrongly crit28. Id. at 531.
29. Id. at 534.
30. See Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill III), 532 F.3d 312, 316–17 (4th Cir.) (explaining Hatfill’s basis for appeal and limiting the appeal to the question of Hatfill’s status as a
public official or public figure), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 765 (2008).
31. 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); see also infra Part II.A.1.
32. See infra Part II.A.2.
33. See infra Part II.B.1.
34. See infra Part II.B.2.
35. 376 U.S. at 279–80.
36. Id. at 256.
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icized Sullivan’s alleged involvement in the harassment of Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr. and other peaceful civil rights protestors in Montgomery.37 Although the Times argued for protection under the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment
in Sullivan’s favor on the basis of a violation of Alabama’s state defamation law and upheld the jury’s finding of $500,000 in damages.38
The Supreme Court reversed the state court’s judgment, and Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, established a new standard for
defamation cases involving public official defamation-plaintiffs by relying upon the First Amendment’s principle of protecting the free exchange of ideas in public debate.39 Noting that a well-functioning
democracy requires a “debate on public issues [that is] uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open,”40 the Court explained that false statements
and erroneous assertions may arise in public discussion.41 Justice
Brennan surmised, however, that the First Amendment must protect
such untrue statements to prevent the press from preemptively selfcensoring publications in fear of future litigation.42 While the Court
did recognize the potential harm that could result to the reputations
of public officials under this new standard,43 Justice Brennan balanced such harms by illustrating that the public’s access to a free exchange of ideas required the Court to create a rule that protected the
press while still granting public officials an avenue for legal redress.44
From the New York Times decision forward, public officials with defamation claims would be required to show through clear and convincing evidence that a publisher acted with “actual malice” or reckless
disregard for the truth when printing false or untrue statements about
a public official or the official’s conduct.45
37. Id. at 256–58.
38. Id. at 256, 263–64.
39. See id. at 269–70, 272, 279–80 (arguing for the need to protect the “breathing
space” of media publications to avoid harmful journalistic self-censorship (citing NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1962); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1956); Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1926); and United States v. Associated Press,
52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943))).
40. Id. at 270.
41. Id. at 271–72.
42. Id. at 279.
43. Id. at 272–73.
44. See id. at 282 (comparing the media privilege under the First Amendment to the
privilege granted to public officials to be free of libel suits by private citizens when the
public official speaks in official capacity).
45. Id. at 279–80 (“The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—
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Shortly after New York Times, in the companion cases Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts46 and Associated Press v. Walker,47 the Supreme Court
extended the coverage of the “actual malice” standard to defamationplaintiffs who qualified as “public figures.”48 In both cases, the plaintiffs held public positions, but neither served as elected officials.49
Chief Justice Warren’s concurrence articulated the Court’s lasting approach that requires “public figures” and “public officials” to meet the
same “actual malice” standard when filing defamation claims.50 Chief
Justice Warren described public figures as individuals “who do not
hold public office at the moment [yet] are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of
their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.”51
2. Gertz: Scope of the “Actual Malice” Standard for Public Figures
The Supreme Court retraced its previous expansion of the First
Amendment’s “actual malice” protections in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,52 when the Court deliberately distinguished the legal and policy
justifications for treating public individuals and private citizens differently in defamation suits against the media.53 In March 1969, publishers of the American Opinion printed a story about a lawyer, Elmer Gertz
(“Gertz”), who represented a family whose son had been killed by a
Chicago police officer.54 The article falsely accused Gertz of supporting communist ideologies, hiding a criminal record, and partaking in
a plot to discredit the Chicago police department.55 Gertz brought a
defamation action against the publisher, claiming that the publisher’s
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.”).
46. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (plurality opinion).
47. 388 U.S. 130 (companion case).
48. Id. at 155.
49. See id. at 135–36 (describing Butts, an athletic director for the University of Georgia
accused of fixing a football game); id. at 140 (describing Walker, a retired Army soldier
who was reportedly leading a charge against federal troops trying to integrate the campus
at the University of Mississippi).
50. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Warren’s concurring opinion
included the legal standard with which a majority of the Court agreed. See id. (Warren,
C.J., concurring) (outlining the Chief Justice’s proposed legal standard for defamation
cases involving public figures); see also id. at 170 (Black, J., concurring) (accepting the
Chief Justice’s legal standard); id. at 172 (Brennan, J., concurring) (same).
51. Id. at 164.
52. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
53. See id. at 345–46 (emphasizing courts’ obligation to provide redress to defamed
private individuals who have not willingly sought public scrutiny in an attempt to acquire
notoriety or influence public affairs).
54. Id. at 325–26.
55. Id. at 326.
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article had damaged Gertz’s “reputation as a lawyer and a citizen.”56
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to provide guidance to lower
courts as to the difference between private and public plaintiffs in the
application of First Amendment privileges in defamation claims
against the media.57
Instead of focusing on the nature of the issue giving rise to the
defamation, the Court explained that courts should focus on whether
a plaintiff qualifies for public official or public figure status.58 Recognizing the importance of the New York Times “actual malice” standard
in the rule’s protection of open public debate, the Court focused on
the harm caused to an individual’s reputation when media outlets
publish defamatory content.59 The Court explained that a private citizen’s lack of ready ability to defend against false media assertions creates a more significant harm than when the media publishes false
content about a public individual.60 Typically, it noted, public officials and public figures have greater access to media sources to defend
themselves,61 place themselves in positions where public scrutiny is
justified and beneficial,62 and take active steps to influence the outcomes of public events.63 Based on these factors, the Court outlined
three categories of plaintiffs for which the “actual malice” standard
would apply: (1) public officials, (2) general-purpose public figures,
56. Id. at 327.
57. See id. at 325 (expressing the struggle the Court has faced in attempting to find a
balance between the First Amendment and defamation law). The Gertz Court took great
lengths to explain prior jurisprudence leading to the Court’s extension of First Amendment protections to defamation cases. See id. at 332–39 (comparing individual Justices’
opinions in New York Times, Curtis Publ’g Co., and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29
(1971)). In particular, the Court examined the results of Rosenbloom, in which five individual Justices wrote opinions which led to courts using three separate, non-uniform methods
of applying the “actual malice” standard in defamation cases involving news media-defendants. See id. at 333 (“One approach has been to extend the [‘actual malice’ standard] to an
expanding variety of situations [based on the nature of the controversy]. Another has
been to vary the level of constitutional privilege for defamatory falsehood with the status of
the person defamed. And a third view would grant to the press and broadcast media absolute immunity for defamation.”).
58. See id. at 346 (arguing that the “public or general interest test” of the subject matter
fails to take into account the private citizen’s inability to access communication outlets that
would allow him to defend attacks against his reputation).
59. See id. at 340–41 (noting the tension between free public debate and state interest
that is inherent in defamation law’s ability to facilitate compensation for individuals whose
reputations have suffered as a result of published attacks).
60. Id. at 344.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 345.
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and (3) limited-purpose public figures.64 While public officials and
general-purpose public figures are required to meet the “actual malice” standard for all defamation claims, limited-purpose public figures
must only meet the heightened standard for claims of defamation arising out of the limited purposes that created the public figure status.65
With these distinctions, the Gertz Court expressly denied extension of
the “actual malice” standard to private individuals’ defamation claims
against the media.66 Thus, holding that Gertz served only as a lawyer
representing clients in a public case, and was not himself a public figure even for the limited purpose of the litigation, the Court reversed
and found that Gertz did not need to prove that the publisher acted
with “actual malice” to succeed in his defamation claim.67
Since Gertz, the Supreme Court has commented directly on the
application of the “actual malice” standard only three times, and in
each case the Court articulated additional limitations on the public
figure doctrine. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,68 then-Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, held that a person’s involvement in the judicial system does not automatically qualify a person for public figure
status for issues arising from the judicial proceedings.69 Then-Justice
Rehnquist noted events that cause public interest do not automatically
64. See id. (distinguishing first between general- and limited-purpose public figures and
assuming a third category embodied by elected officials, or public officials). Furthermore,
the Court suggested that an individual could qualify as an “involuntary public figure” without any voluntary action to gain prominence. Id. Courts, though, have proven unwilling
to extend this involuntary category in defamation cases, and the Gertz Court qualified the
classification’s application as “exceedingly rare.” Id.; see also Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co.
(Hatfill III), 532 F.3d 312, 318 n.3 (4th Cir.) (commenting on the rarity of courts’ application of the “involuntary public figure” classification), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 765 (2008).
65. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351 (explaining how an individual could qualify as “a public
figure for a limited range of issues”).
66. See id. at 345, 347–48 (discussing the rationale for distinguishing between public
and private individuals in defamation cases).
67. Id. at 352. However, the Court ordered a new trial because the district court jury
had imposed liability without fault and had presumed damages without proof of injury. Id.
68. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). In Firestone, the defamation-plaintiff, Mary Alice Firestone, a
prominent member of Palm Beach society, claimed that Time Magazine damaged her reputation by erroneously reporting that she had engaged in an extramarital affair, leading to
her divorce from her husband, Russell Firestone. Id. at 450–52. Time Magazine writers
acquired the information from public records published by the district court overseeing
the Firestones’ divorce proceedings. Id. at 451. In Time Magazine’s defense, the editors
claimed that Firestone qualified as a public figure and the article reported facts the district
court had made public. Id. at 453.
69. Id. at 455–56. But see id. at 471–72 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that any restraint on the media’s ability to inform public debate creates likely grounds for media selfcensorship); id. at 484–85 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (maintaining that Firestone’s public
prominence and engagement in press conferences related to the subject matter qualified
her as a public figure required to meet the “actual malice” standard).
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qualify all parties involved as public figures; rather, private individuals
must take more active and public steps to influence the events’ outcomes to satisfy the limited-purpose public figure classification.70 Second, three years later the Supreme Court in Wolston v. Reader’s Digest
Association, Inc.71 held that a private individual does not become a
public figure merely by being involved in a public issue or by unwillingly being exposed to media attention.72 Third, in Hutchinson v.
Proxmire,73 a researcher’s receipt of significant government funds to
conduct federal studies was not sufficient to qualify the researcher as a
limited-purpose public figure for issues arising from the federal research projects.74 The Court concluded that the federal researcher’s
passive response to media questioning about an issue of public concern and his history of publication in his academic field did not disqualify the researcher from maintaining his status as a private
citizen.75

70. Id. at 454–55 (majority opinion).
71. 443 U.S. 157 (1979). In Wolston, the defamation-plaintiff, Ilya Wolston, claimed
that Reader’s Digest Association, Inc. (“Reader’s Digest”) published a book that included
false facts about Wolston’s affiliation with the Soviet Union’s espionage organization in the
United States. Id. at 159–60. During a grand jury investigation of Wolston’s relatives, Wolston had failed to respond to a subpoena which required him to testify before a grand jury,
leading the court to hold Wolston in contempt. Id. at 162. Wolston’s failure to appear
generated significant media attention, and Reader’s Digest argued that Wolston’s decision
not to respond to the subpoena served as Wolston’s active involvement in a public controversy, sufficient to qualify him as a limited-purpose public figure. Id. at 162, 165. The
lower courts agreed with Reader’s Digest and ruled in favor of the publishers. Id. at 165.
72. See id. at 167 (noting that events generating media attention do not automatically
qualify the events’ key players as public figures in defamation cases that arise from the
media’s coverage).
73. 443 U.S. 111 (1979). In Hutchinson, Ronald Hutchinson, the defamation-plaintiff
and a research behavioral scientist at the Kalamazoo State Mental Hospital, received federal funds for research projects devoted to the study of emotional behavior for NASA and
the U.S. Navy. Id. at 114–15. Speaking on the Senate floor and sending newsletters to
constituents arguing against wasteful government spending, Senator William Proxmire
listed Hutchinson as a recipient of a “Golden Fleece Award,” a symbolic classification the
Senator hoped would bring attention to federal dollars the Senator believed scientists were
wasting on ineffective research projects. Id. at 115–17. Responding, Hutchinson filed a
defamation suit against Senator Proxmire, alleging that the Senator’s broadcasting of
speeches and distribution of newsletters that described the “Golden Fleece Award” misrepresented Hutchinson’s research and injured his reputation in the scientific community. Id.
at 118.
74. Id. at 135–36. The Court added that public figure status may have only been appropriate for defamatory reporting related directly to the publicly funded studies. Id.
75. Id. at 134–36.
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The Public Controversy & the Fitzgerald Test: The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals’ Formula for Distinguishing Between Private
Citizens and Public Figures in Defamation Claims
Against the Media

B.

1.

Developing the Fourth Circuit’s Fitzgerald Test

In Fitzgerald v. Penthouse International, Ltd.,76 the Fourth Circuit set
forth a five factor test for determining whether a defamation-plaintiff
qualified as a limited-purpose public figure.77 The defamation-plaintiff in Fitzgerald, a federal researcher who studied the military use of
dolphins for the United States Navy and the Central Intelligence
Agency, alleged that Penthouse had ruined the researcher’s reputation
by publishing a defamatory article about the researcher’s past conduct.78 Specifically, Fitzgerald claimed that Penthouse printed a story
which implied that Fitzgerald had conspired to engage in espionage
with several Latin American countries’ military officials by attempting
to sell top secret dolphin technology to them.79 Fitzgerald was not an
elected official, and his lack of general notoriety did not qualify him
as a general-purpose public figure.80 Thus, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s finding that Fitzgerald’s public appearances
and actions related to his research on the military use of dolphins
qualified him as a limited-purpose public figure for defamation claims
stemming from his work with dolphin-related technology.81
First, the Fitzgerald court defined the pertinent public controversy
to determine whether the issue was of significant public concern. By
reviewing the context of the Penthouse article, the court found that the
military use of dolphins was a sufficiently public topic of discussion
that merited status as a controversy worthy of opening an individual to
limited-purpose public figure classification.82 Next, relying on Supreme Court jurisprudence,83 Judge Ervin, writing for the three-judge
unanimous opinion, outlined the following factors under which the
court analyzed Fitzgerald’s status:
76. 661 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1982).
77. Id. at 668.
78. See id. at 669 (describing the written context of the Penthouse article and Fitzgerald’s
contact with the media).
79. Id. at 670.
80. Id. at 668–69.
81. See id. at 668 (reviewing the district court’s grant of Penthouse’s motion for summary
judgment).
82. See id. at 669 (analyzing the extent of coverage of subject-matter and “moral and
humanitarian” concerns related to military use of dolphins).
83. See id. at 668–69 (citing Wolston, Hutchinson, Gertz, and New York Times, among
others).
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[Whether] (1) the plaintiff had access to channels of effective communication; (2) the plaintiff voluntarily assumed a
role of special prominence in a public controversy; (3) the
plaintiff sought to influence the resolution or outcome of
the controversy; (4) the controversy existed prior to the publication of the defamatory statements; and (5) the plaintiff
retained public figure status at the time of the alleged
defamation.84
The court examined Fitzgerald’s relationship with the Navy; his
public lectures on the subject of dolphin technology; his printing of
materials about the use of dolphins in anti-submarine warfare; and his
appearance on 60 Minutes, where he was interviewed about the topic
of dolphin technology.85 Concluding that Fitzgerald “thrust himself
into a position of special prominence with respect to the controversy”
and because he “sought pecuniary gain through the military and nonmilitary use of dolphin technology,”86 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s finding that Fitzgerald qualified as a limited-purpose
public figure for issues arising from his dolphin technology research.87 Thereafter, the court reversed the district court’s summary
judgment that dismissed Fitzgerald’s defamation claim, holding that,
although Fitzgerald qualified as a limited-purpose public figure, the
lower court’s record did not provide sufficient evidence for the court
to rule as a matter of law that Fitzgerald had failed to meet the “actual
malice” standard.88
Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit employed the Fitzgerald test to
decide Reuber v. Food Chemical News, Inc.89 In Reuber, Melvin Reuber, a
scientific researcher, claimed that Food Chemical News, Inc. unlawfully reprinted and widely published an employer-employee reprimand letter that allegedly discredited Reuber’s scientific research on
the harmfulness of certain pesticides.90 The court began by generally
outlining the applicable public controversy, which the court determined encompassed Reuber’s participation in controversies involving
pesticides, particularly the pesticide malathion.91 The court then
84. Id. at 668.
85. Id. at 669.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 669–70.
88. Id. at 670, 672.
89. 925 F.2d 703, 708–11 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
90. Id. at 707.
91. Id. at 708. The court clarified the scope of the controversy by citing a case from the
District of Columbia Circuit. Id. at 709 (citing Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627
F.2d 1287, 1290, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). Specifically, the court noted that a person in a
specialized field “who has not attracted general notoriety may nonetheless be a public fig-
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progressed through application of the Fitzgerald factors.92 Finding
that Reuber frequently interacted with media sources reporting on
the risks associated with malathion, the court found that Reuber had
sufficient access to media sources to defend against attacks against his
reputation as a qualified pesticide researcher.93 Diverging slightly
from Fitzgerald, the Reuber court combined the second and third Fitzgerald factors to conclude that Reuber’s special prominence developed
through his attempts to influence the controversy surrounding the
carcinogenicity of malathion.94 Finally, the court examined the historical background of the controversy and Reuber’s influence therein
to hold that Reuber qualified as a limited-purpose public figure.95
Thus, Reuber was required to demonstrate that Food Chemical News,
Inc. published the reprimand letter with “actual malice” or reckless
disregard.96
2. Crystallizing the Two-Part Inquiry Analysis
Adding to the Fitzgerald test, Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.97 set
forth a two-part inquiry by which Fourth Circuit courts analyze defamation claims involving potential limited-purpose public figures.98
Vincent and Doris Foretich, grandparents of a child involved in a
highly publicized familial custody dispute, brought a defamation
claim against ABC for producing a docudrama that the Foretiches
claimed to have damaged the elderly couple’s reputation.99 Ruling on
an interlocutory appeal of a lower court judgment that held that the
Foretiches qualified as private citizens in their defamation claim
against ABC, Judge Murnaghan, writing the unanimous three-judge
opinion, first expressly examined the public controversy in quesure in the context of a particular controversy covered by publications of specialized interest.” Id.
(emphasis added).
92. Id. at 708–11.
93. Id. at 708–09. Reuber had worked with Congress and the Environmental Protection Agency to analyze the risks of pesticides, and had contributed to “numerous television,
newspaper, and radio reports.” Id. at 708. Most significantly, Reuber contributed to a
report on the dangers of malathion at the height of the public controversy surrounding
the general use of the pesticide. Id.
94. Id. at 709.
95. Id. at 710–11.
96. Id. at 711. The court also suggested that unwilling participants in a controversy
could avail themselves to public figure status if they engaged in a course of action that
“invites public attention.” Id. at 709 (citing Clyburn v. News World Comm’n, Inc., 903 F.2d
29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1990); McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942, 949–50 (3d Cir. 1985)).
97. 37 F.3d 1541 (4th Cir. 1994).
98. Id. at 1553.
99. Id. at 1543.
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tion.100 Second, the court assessed the “nature and extent of [the
plaintiff’s] participation in [that particular] controversy” to determine
whether limited-purpose public figure status was justified.101
Applying this systematic two-part inquiry, Judge Murnaghan
sought guidance from Gertz, Wolston, and Firestone, among others, to
assess the appropriate scope of public controversies worthy of activating a public figure analysis.102 Rather than creating a new rule, Judge
Murnaghan adopted the definition of “public controversy” used by
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit:
A public controversy is not simply a matter of interest to the
public; it must be a real dispute, the outcome of which affects the general public or some segment of it in an appreciable way . . . . [E]ssentially private concerns or disagreements
do not become public controversies simply because they attract attention . . . . Rather, a public controversy is a dispute
that in fact has received public attention because its ramifications will be felt by persons who are not direct
participants.103
Within this framework, Judge Murnaghan set forth the factual circumstances that convinced the court that the Foretiches’ claim
stemmed from a qualified “public controversy”: The events were
highly publicized; a congressional investigation had begun in response to the controversy; the controversy had caused Congress and
the President to become involved in the familial dispute to pass legislation to waive criminal contempt charges brought against the child’s
father; and the dispute raised national awareness of the collateral effects of drawn-out custody battles.104
The court then progressed through the second part of the twopart inquiry, using the five-factor Fitzgerald test to determine whether
the Foretiches participated in the child custody controversy significantly enough to warrant their status as limited-purpose public
figures.105 While recognizing that the Foretiches had presented themselves to the media on several occasions to rebut the charges against
100. Id. at 1554–55.
101. Id. at 1554, 1555–56.
102. Id. at 1554.
103. Id. (quoting Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir.
1980)) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Id. at 1555.
105. See id. at 1555–58 (examining the number of media reports about the controversy,
the effect of the controversy on public policy, and the nature of the Foretiches’ public
appearances).

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-3\MLR306.txt

738

unknown

Seq: 15

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

21-APR-09

11:12

[VOL. 68:724

them and had appeared as passive participants in support of their son
on a television talk show, the court refused to include these public
appearances in the Fitzgerald test analysis.106 The court looked to the
serious effect that charges of child sexual assault could have on individuals’ reputations,107 and reasoned that such threat of serious harm
justified private individuals’ decisions to appear actively before the
media to defend their reputations.108 Thus, the court held that the
sum of the Foretiches’ public appearances was reasonable under the
circumstances, proportionate to the charges against them, and not
“excessively published.”109 The Foretiches’ generally defensive participation in the public controversy was not significant enough to qualify
them as limited-purpose public figures under the Fitzgerald test, even
though they were involved in a public controversy.110
In Carr v. Forbes,111 the Fourth Circuit again outlined the established culmination of principles for cases involving disputes over
whether a defamation-plaintiff qualifies as a limited-purpose public
figure.112 In Carr, the Fourth Circuit followed the mechanical, systematic two-step inquiry to assess the defamation claim which allegedly
involved a limited-purpose public figure plaintiff.113 Relying upon the
106. Id. at 1557–58.
107. Id. at 1558 (“We, too, recognize the devastation that public accusations of child
sexual abuse can wreak, and we are extremely reluctant to attribute public-figure status to
otherwise private persons merely because they have responded to such accusations in a
reasonable attempt to vindicate their reputations.”).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1563–64.
110. Id. at 1564. The court also examined the common law privilege of reply to question whether or not the Foretiches had waived their privilege by going too far in their
defensive media appearance. Id. at 1559–60. On this point, the court reasoned that the
Foretiches’ defensive public appearances were relevant, responsive, proportionate, not excessively published, and reasonable in relation to the gravity of the juvenile assault charges
against them. Id. at 1561–63.
111. 259 F.3d 273 (4th Cir. 2001). Robert Carr, the defamation-plaintiff and a developer of public infrastructure projects, brought a claim against Forbes, Inc. for its publication of an article that cast doubt on Carr’s integrity as a businessman. Id. at 275. The
controversy arose out of Carr’s successful bid to build a public highway project in South
Carolina. Id. at 276. The Forbes magazine article described Carr’s past troublesome business practices with other municipalities and specifically outlined Carr’s personal business
failures that had doomed another public sewer system project in Arizona. Id. at 277.
112. Id. at 278.
113. See id. at 279–82 (defining the controversy specifically and applying the facts of
Carr’s involvement in the controversy to the Fitzgerald factors). In its review, the court
outlined the Fourth Circuit’s approach:
[W]e conduct a two-part inquiry. First, we ascertain whether a public controversy
gave rise to the defamatory statement. Second, we determine whether the plaintiff’s participation in that controversy sufficed to establish him as a public figure
within the context of that public controversy. The defendant bears the burden of
proving the plaintiff’s public figure status.
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Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Foretich and Firestone, Judge Motz first described how the negative externalities of a failed, publicly financed
sewage project affected a community’s public welfare and were thus
significant enough to create a worthy “public controversy.”114 The
court explicitly defined the controversy as “the financing and construction of the Apache Junction sewer and the Southern Connector
highway.”115 Second, the court used the five Fitzgerald factors to assess
whether the plaintiff’s role in that particular public controversy qualified the plaintiff as a limited-purpose public figure.116 Looking only
at the facts that applied to the construction and financing of the two
public projects, the court held that the plaintiff’s significant public
exposure and his active participation in acquiring the public project
funds justified his status as a limited-purpose public figure.117
III.

THE COURT’S REASONING

In Hatfill v. New York Times Co. (Hatfill III),118 the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the Eastern District of Virginia’s judgment and held that
Hatfill failed to meet the “actual malice” standard in his defamation
claims against the Times, which was required because Hatfill qualified
as a limited-purpose public figure with respect to the controversy over
bioterrorism and the nation’s preparedness for a biological attack.119
Writing for the unanimous three-judge panel, Judge Niemeyer began
by explaining the importance of maintaining the integrity of the “actual malice” standard in defamation exception cases involving public
officials and public figures.120 The court explained that the First
Amendment’s protection of free speech and a free press necessitated
a legal standard that allowed citizens to openly discuss public officials
while granting some refuge for malicious attacks on public officials’
reputations.121
Avoiding the question of whether Hatfill qualified as a public official or an involuntary public figure,122 the court examined whether
Id. at 278 (internal citation omitted).
114. Id. at 278–79 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976); Foretich v.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1554 (4th Cir. 1994)).
115. Id. at 279.
116. See id. at 280–82 (evaluating each individual factor of the Fitzgerald test).
117. See id. at 281–82 (describing the effect of Carr’s past projects in Arizona on the
defamation suit involving a more current project in South Carolina).
118. 532 F.3d 312 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 765 (2008).
119. Id. at 324–25.
120. Id. at 317–18.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 319 n.4. In a footnote, the court described the difference between a public
official and a public figure. Id. at 317 n.2. The court noted that public officials include
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Hatfill’s background, experience, and public exposure qualified him
as either a general-purpose or limited-purpose public figure or as a
private citizen in his defamation suit against the Times and Kristof.123
Examining Gertz, Judge Niemeyer explained the legal effect of the difference between a general-purpose public figure, one who holds a position “‘of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed
public figures for all purposes,’”124 and a limited-purpose public figure,
one who has “‘thrust [himself] to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.’”125 In defamation cases, the court explained, a generalpurpose public figure must prove the defendant’s “actual malice” in
publishing a potentially harmful assertion that may be related in any
way to the public figure’s fitness; whereas, a limited-purpose public
figure must only prove “actual malice” for assertions related to the
particular public controversy for which the public figure has gained
his or her prominence.126
To determine whether Hatfill functioned as a limited-purpose
public figure for the purposes of his defamation case, Judge Niemeyer
evaluated the events surrounding publication of Kristof’s editorials in
the context of the Fourth Circuit’s five-factor Fitzgerald test.127 The
court engaged in an extensive examination of Hatfill’s education,
background, and professional involvement with the Central Intelligence Agency, National Institutes of Health, State Department, Defense Intelligence Agency, and a private defense contractor, Science
Applications International Corporation.128 The court further outlined Hatfill’s public interactions with the media before and after the
persons in government who hold public office or hold a position where the qualifications
of the individual are pertinent to the public’s interest. Id. (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974)). Like general-purpose public figures, all public officials
must show “actual malice” in defamation cases where an allegedly defamatory statement is
at all relevant to the official’s fitness for office. Id. at 318. Limited-purpose public officials,
who in contrast may not necessarily hold public office, are only required to show “actual
malice” for statements related to the range of issues for which the general public would
reasonably recognize the public figure as a person who “‘ha[d] assumed [a] role[ ] of
especial prominence in the affairs of society.’” Id. at 317 n.2 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at
345).
123. See id. at 319–24 (presenting the factual background of Hatfill’s case and applying
the facts to the Fitzgerald test).
124. Id. at 318 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345); see also supra note 122 and accompanying
text.
125. Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 318 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345).
126. Id. at 317–19; see also supra note 122 and accompanying text.
127. See Hatfill, 532 F.3d at 318–19 (quoting the five factors set out in Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 691 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 1982)).
128. See id. at 319–20 (discussing Hatfill’s education in Rhodesia (now known as
Zimbabwe) and his breadth of work for government agencies).

R

R
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2001 anthrax attacks, and illustrated Hatfill’s extensive publications as
a specialist in the field of bioterrorism threat readiness.129 After this
detailed study, the court immediately examined the first Fitzgerald factor and concluded that Hatfill had sufficient access to effective communication as demonstrated by his professional prominence and his
publication as an expert in his field.130
After establishing that the first factor was satisfied, the court applied the facts to the remaining four Fitzgerald factors.131 The court
described the particular public controversy at issue, and agreed with
the Times’ broader interpretation of the scope.132 Judge Niemeyer analyzed Hatfill’s defamation claims in the more expansive context of
national security, and more specifically the nation’s readiness against
threats of bioterrorism.133 Relying on the broad national security controversy, as opposed to Hatfill’s more narrow argument that the controversy in Kristof’s articles only related to the FBI’s investigation of
the 2001 anthrax attacks, the court reasoned that Hatfill frequently
took active steps to influence issues related to bioterrorism in the
United States.134 Further, Hatfill’s active engagement in public issues
related to bioterrorism qualified him as a limited-purpose public figure for all issues related to the threats of bioterrorism, including for

129. See id. at 320–22 (discussing Hatfill’s interactions with various media outlets in his
academic and professional capacities).
130. See id. at 322 (explaining that Hatfill’s prominence in bioterrorism research allowed him to “command attention in this field”). The court compared Hatfill’s exposure
to that of the defamation-plaintiff in Reuber v. Food Chemical News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 708–09
(4th Cir. 1991), and concluded that Hatfill’s extensive contacts with media sources were
greater than those demonstrated by the limited-purpose public figure in Reuber. Hatfill III,
532 F.3d at 322.
131. Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 322–24. In the midst of analyzing the second and third Fitzgerald factors, the court went through a lengthy evaluation of the scope and nature of the
controversy at issue. Id.
132. See id. at 322–23 (presenting both parties’ contentions as to the scope of the controversy). In analyzing the scope of the controversy, the court analogized the facts in
Hatfill III to those present in Fitzgerald. Id. at 323–24.
133. The court stated:
We agree with the view suggested by The New York Times. In light of the purpose
of the public figure doctrine to encourage robust and uninhibited commentary
on public issues, it stands to reason that we should look to the scope of the message conveyed in The New York Times through the articles that Dr. Hatfill is
challenging. A fair reading of Kristof’s columns reveals a debate about national
security, the nation’s lack of preparedness for bioterrorism, and the example provided by the FBI’s investigation of the anthrax attacks in light of the evidence
appearing against Dr. Hatfill.
Id. at 323.
134. Id. at 324.
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example, all issues germane to the anthrax attacks in 2001.135 The
court held that Hatfill was required to show that the Times and Kristof
published the five articles with “actual malice”.136 Thus, Hatfill either
had to show that the Times or Kristof published the material “with
knowledge that [the assertions] were false or with reckless disregard
of [the articles’] falsity” to succeed on his defamation claims.137
Based on this finding, the court turned to whether clear and convincing evidence obtained during discovery illustrated that the Times
or Kristof acted with “actual malice” in publishing the editorials.138
The court expressly noted that evidence of mistaken facts in Kristof’s
reporting or a lack of ordinary care in verifying source information
would not have met Hatfill’s burden.139 As such, the court concluded
that Kristof was diligent in pursuing the factual background to support his articles, and held that “no reasonable jury could find that
Kristof had [published the articles with] ‘a high degree of awareness’
that Dr. Hatfill was not the anthrax mailer.”140 Because the court
found that Hatfill qualified as a limited-purpose public figure for issues related to the field of bioterrorism threat analysis, the issue of the
2001 anthrax attacks was merely a microcosm of the larger national
security controversy in Kristof’s bioterrorism editorials, and no reasonable jury could find “actual malice” in the Times or Kristof’s actions,
Judge Niemeyer affirmed the trial judge’s summary judgment decision and dismissed the first defamation count in Hatfill’s appeal.141
Using the same analysis, the court quickly dismissed Hatfill’s second and third counts of defamation per se and intentional infliction
of emotional distress.142 Agreeing with the lower court’s use of the
“subsidiary meaning doctrine,”143 Judge Niemeyer found that the editorial columns as a whole were not defamatory, and so individual assertions within the columns could not qualify independently for
135. See id. (including analysis of Hatfill’s prominence as an academic before the 2001
anthrax attacks and his attempt to use the attacks as a “platform” to gain further
prominence).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 324–25 (describing Hatfill’s “actual malice” burden as having to show that
Kristof published the articles either with knowledge or with a high degree of certainty that
Hatfill was not the anthrax killer).
139. Id. at 325.
140. Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)).
141. Id. at 324–25.
142. See id. at 325–26 (approaching each of Hatfill’s allegations with the same legal
framework used in Hatfill’s foundational common law defamation claim).
143. See Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill II), 488 F. Supp. 2d 522, 532 (E.D. Va. 2007)
(citing Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298, 307–08, 312 (2d Cir. 1986)), aff’d, 432 F.3d 312
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 765 (2008).
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claims of defamation per se.144 Similarly, the court agreed with the
district court’s finding that Virginia law at minimum required a showing of “intentional or reckless [conduct that] was outrageous and intolerable” to succeed on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.145 Because Hatfill failed to meet the lower standard of “actual malice” in his original defamation claim, the court denied his
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress as well.146
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Hatfill v. New York Times Co. (Hatfill III), the Fourth Circuit
applied the limited-purpose public figure doctrine with a broadened
scope of the particular public controversy at issue, which led to the
court’s dismissal of an individual’s defamation claim filed against a
major news organization.147 The court based its opinion on a disorganized application of the Fourth Circuit’s two-part inquiry—before defining the particular controversy explicitly, the court started the legal
analysis by applying the Fitzgerald test. This loosened analysis resulted
in the court overestimating the scope of the relevant public controversy.148 The court should have instead first defined the public controversy, and then applied the Fitzgerald test with more properly
limited evidence relating to Hatfill’s professional background.149 A
strict application of the Fourth Circuit’s established two-part inquiry
may have caused the court to more effectively protect the rights of
private citizens in defamation suits against major media outlets, most
notably when the media reports on national security concerns.150
A. Hatfill III Misapplies the Two-Part Inquiry Used for LimitedPurpose Public Figure Cases
Reviewing the district court’s finding that Hatfill qualified as a
limited-purpose public figure, the court began its analysis by reiterating the importance of the First Amendment’s protections of free
speech and the press.151 The court analyzed the most significant, relevant Supreme Court cases dealing with the First Amendment’s effect
on defamation law, particularly with regard to the application of a
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 325.
Id. at 325–26.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 322–25.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 317.
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public official or public figure’s obligation to meet an “actual malice”
burden.152 The court also recognized the private citizen’s right to redress attacks on his or her reputation when the media negligently exceeds its duty to inform public discussion.153 After analyzing the
Supreme Court precedent, however, the court overlooked other relevant Fourth Circuit jurisprudence that should have compelled it to
begin by defining the pertinent public controversy.154 Instead, the
court laid out Hatfill’s experience as a bioterrorism researcher and
moved prematurely into the Fitzgerald test analysis.155 As a result,
Judge Niemeyer did not address the pertinent public controversy at
issue until after he had already begun the application of the Fitzgerald
test,156 and evaluated whether Hatfill had access to effective channels
of communication prior to defining the relevant public
controversy.157
The court should have applied the Fitzgerald test only after it had
defined the particular public controversy at issue.158 The purpose of
the two-part inquiry framework for cases involving limited-purpose
public figures is to protect private citizens from having to meet the

152. See id. at 317–18 (citing Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Wolston v.
Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448
(1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
153. See id. (discussing the Supreme Court’s attempts to balance the interests of private
citizens with the benefits of an informed public discussion about public affairs).
154. See id. at 322 (addressing Hatfill’s access to communication before focusing on the
relevant public controversy at issue). But see Carr v. Forbes, Inc., 259 F.3d 273, 278 (4th
Cir. 2001) (using the two-part inquiry to define the scope of the relevant controversy
before applying the Fitzgerald test); Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1554
(4th Cir. 1994) (same).
155. See Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 319–22 (describing the full array of Hatfill’s professional
experience as a bioterrorism researcher and using those facts in the Fitzgerald test).
156. Id. at 322 (“To determine whether these combined factors [the second and third
factors of the Fitzgerald test] are satisfied, we first address the nature of the ‘particular
public controversy’ that gave rise to the alleged defamation to determine whether Dr.
Hatfill thrust himself into that controversy.”).
157. See id.
158. See, e.g., Carr, 259 F.3d at 278–79 (explaining that in the initial analysis of the particular controversy, courts must review “the scope of the alleged defamatory statements and
the facts surrounding them”); Foretich, 37 F.3d at 1554 (describing explicitly the need to
first address the particular public controversy at issue). Additionally, state courts outside
the Fourth Circuit have emphasized the importance of first reviewing the public controversy to apply Supreme Court precedent appropriately when cases involve limited-purpose
public figures. See, e.g., Lassonde v. Stanton, 956 A.2d 332, 340 (N.H. 2008) (“Identification of the implicated public controversy is not a mere formality, because the scope of the
controversy in which the plaintiff involves himself defines the bounds of his public presence.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
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heightened “actual malice” standard in defamation claims.159 The
two-part inquiry restrains the court’s analysis to the limited purposes
defined within the scope of the controversy.160 Also, the two-part test
prevents the court from considering a defamation-plaintiff’s actions
that are unrelated to the particular public controversy when the court
begins the Fitzgerald test analysis.161 However, in Hatfill III, by beginning the limited-purpose public figure analysis without first defining a
particular public controversy, Judge Niemeyer had established at the
outset what he had sought to prove—that Kristof’s op-ed articles discussed bioterrorism-related national security threats and that Hatfill
possessed extensive public exposure and a lengthy background in bioterrorism research.162
The purpose of Kristof’s articles, while generally falling into a national security framework, specifically focused on one particular suspect involved in the 2001 anthrax attacks and the FBI’s failure to
follow-up on this suspect effectively.163 Had the court strictly defined
159. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345–46 (1974) (discussing the importance of recognizing the important interests at stake to the individual and society as a
whole in creating an appropriate application of the “actual malice” standard in defamation
cases); see also Foretich, 37 F.3d at 1553 (“First, was there a particular ‘public controversy’ that
gave rise to the alleged defamation? Second, was the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s
participation in that particular controversy sufficient to justify ‘public figure’ status?”).
The second component of the inquiry is satisfied by the Fitzgerald test. Carr, 259 F.3d at
280; Foretich, 37 F.3d at 1555–56.
160. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Lassonde, 956 A.2d at 340 (noting the importance of strictly defining the
controversy); cf. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135–36 (1979) (explaining that the
defamation-plaintiff’s experience in his broad field of expertise should not be included in
the public figure analysis when the scope of the controversy dealt with a more specific
context of events giving rise to the defamation).
162. Rather than approach the question of Hatfill’s access to media with regard to a yetto-be-named controversy, Judge Niemeyer first pointed to the extensive record of Hatfill’s
media appearances and government interactions as a prominent bioterrorism researcher.
See Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 322 (discussing Hatfill’s work with government agencies and the
researcher’s appearance in media reports). However, without having defined the particular controversy at issue, whether Hatfill’s background as a bioterrorism expert was important should have been unknown. Compare Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135 (refusing to examine
non-pertinent media appearances and work with government agencies), with Hatfill III, 532
F.3d at 322 (including Hatfill’s public background without first explaining why the background was relevant to the particular public controversy at issue).
163. Kristof’s five op-ed articles for the Times primarily focused on the FBI’s investigation of the 2001 anthrax attacks. See Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill I), 416 F.3d 320,
325–28 (4th Cir. 2005) (reproducing the critical excerpts of Kristof’s op-ed articles between May 2002 and August 2002). Further, in August 2008, after the Fourth Circuit decided Hatfill III, Kristof wrote an apology op-ed directed at Hatfill, which the Times
published. Nicholas D. Kristof, The Media’s Balancing Act, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2008, at A27.
In this apology, Kristof summarized his purpose to include “Mr. Z” in his articles: “I referred to ‘Mr. Z’ as an example of the flaws in the FBI’s investigation.” Id. Kristof explained later in the piece that he pursued the story because of his concern for the public’s
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the prima facie context of Kristof’s articles before considering Hatfill’s
background as a bioterrorism researcher, the court may have settled
on a particular public controversy that was truly present and central in
all five of Kristof’s op-eds.164 Instead, the court evaluated the op-ed
series in the broad context of national security from the outset, and
Judge Niemeyer justified his definition of the particular controversy
by citing merely two minor phrases from Kristof’s articles, both of
which Kristof had written as corollary justifications of the main issue
surrounding the FBI’s failed search for the 2001 anthrax attacker.165
The purpose of the Fitzgerald test is to evaluate a presumed private citizen’s involvement in a particular controversy to determine
whether that private citizen should qualify as a limited-purpose public
figure for the particular public controversy in question.166 The twopart inquiry, which secondarily includes the Fitzgerald test, plays an integral role in balancing a private citizen’s right to maintain his good
name against society’s generalized interest in fostering free discussion.167 By avoiding the first step of the Fourth Circuit’s two-part inquiry, the court created two significant errors in its opinion.
interest, but involved Hatfill specifically for the purpose of disparaging the FBI’s efforts.
Id. Similarly, Hatfill’s legal team argued to the Fourth Circuit that the lower court’s broad
interpretation of the controversy read the “particular” requirement out of the legal analysis, thereby resulting in an erroneous scope of the events at issue. Brief of the Appellant, at
25–26, Hatfill III, 532 F.3d 312 (No. 07-1162) [hereinafter Brief of the Appellant].
164. See Brief of the Appellant, supra note 163, at 25–27 (describing the potentially absurd results to defamation-plaintiffs who courts subject to overly broad scopes of the particular public controversy in question).
165. See Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 323 (pointing to the articles’ phrases “to threaten
America’s national security” and “there are two larger issues [related to national security]”
to define the broader purpose of Kristof’s series).
166. See Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 691 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 1982) (evaluating
the limited-purpose public figure factors after defining the particular public controversy);
see generally Bradden C. Backer, Note, Constitutional Protection of Critical Speech and the Public
Figure Doctrine: Retreat by Reaffirmation, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 568, 585–95 (discussing the development of the factors for qualifying a private citizen as a limited-purpose public figure).
The original application of the “actual malice” standard to defamation-plaintiffs provided
the media greater ability to discuss the fitness or character of public individuals whose
actions affected the lives of the public in general, not private citizens. Cf. Curtis Publ’g Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1967) (requiring a popular head football coach of a major
state university to meet the “actual malice” standard); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 256 (1964) (creating the “actual malice” standard to extend the media’s ability to
discuss the fitness of an elected Commissioner of the City of Montgomery, Alabama). But
see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345, 351 (1974) (explaining the dangers of an
overly expansive application of the “actual malice” standard on private citizens and refusing to extend the public figure standard to a private lawyer).
167. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135–36 (1979) (arguing that defining
the controversy prevents a private citizen from being placed into a defensive position in his
case against a defamatory media publication); see also Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert,
Suing the News Media in the Age of Tabloid Journalism: L. Lin Wood and the Battle for Accountabil-

R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-3\MLR306.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 24

HATFILL V. NEW YORK TIMES CO.

21-APR-09

11:12

747

First, the court inappropriately evaluated the first Fitzgerald factor—whether Hatfill had sufficient access to the media to defend
against harmful media reports—by including analysis of Hatfill’s media contacts that may have been irrelevant to the true controversy at
issue.168 An ability to defend attacks through a public forum increases
the likelihood that an individual may meet the first Fitzgerald factor
and subsequently may qualify as a limited-purpose public figure.169 In
Hatfill’s case, however, the court detailed Hatfill’s professional association with government agencies; his historical appearances on radio,
television, and print media prior to the 2001 anthrax attacks; and his
prominence in the bioterrorism community, generally, without ever
first detailing why these associations were relevant to his access to
communication.170 Had the controversy correctly been limited to
Hatfill’s ability to utilize media outlets to speak out about the FBI’s
investigation of the 2001 anthrax attacks, Hatfill’s interaction with the
media may not have been sufficient to satisfy the Fitzgerald test’s first
factor, and may have qualified Hatfill as a private citizen for his defamation claim against the Times.171 Indeed, Hatfill’s media exposure
was limited until after the publication of Kristof’s May 24, 2002 New
York Times op-ed which urged readers to demand that the FBI more

ity, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 467, 479 (2006) (explaining that courts
across the country often misapply the limited-purpose public figure standard to include
any individual who receives public attention).
168. See Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 322 (“[O]n whether Dr. Hatfill had ‘access to channels of
effective communication,’ it becomes readily apparent from the record that Dr. Hatfill was
viewed as an expert on the topics of bioterrorism and biological weapons, including anthrax, and that he could command attention in this field.”).
169. See Fitzgerald, 691 F.2d at 669 (outlining the plaintiff’s significant interaction with
public media forums to justify qualifying him as a limited-purpose public figure); accord
Reuber v. Food Chemical News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 708–09 (4th Cir. 1991) (discussing the
importance of a limited-purpose public figure’s access to communication in qualifying him
as such, yet permitting Reuber’s failure to rebut the published claims as satisfying the first
Fitzgerald factor).
170. See Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 319 (outlining Hatfill’s background without first defining
the purpose of doing so); see also Brief of the Appellant, supra note 163, at 24–25 (describing how Hatfill’s professional experience would be irrelevant to the FBI’s 2001 anthrax
investigations had Hatfill not been forced to refute allegations that he was involved in the
attacks).
171. Further, the court could have reached the same result, dismissing Hatfill’s claim, by
qualifying Hatfill as a private citizen. See Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 324–25 (explaining that the
lower court’s record sufficiently showed that Kristof sincerely believed that Hatfill was the
attacker and did not act negligently in reporting the story). Such an opinion would have
concluded Hatfill’s case without unnecessarily expanding the scope of the relevant particular public controversy for future Fourth Circuit defamation-plaintiffs.

R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-3\MLR306.txt

748

unknown

Seq: 25

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

21-APR-09

11:12

[VOL. 68:724

seriously investigate “one middle-aged American” in the bioterrorism
community.172
Second, the court improperly reviewed Hatfill’s background and
professional experience as a bioterrorism researcher in the context of
a combined analysis of the second and third Fitzgerald factors.173 Not
until this belated point in the opinion did Judge Niemeyer seek to
define the scope of the relevant controversy.174 Furthermore, by having already put forth the array of Hatfill’s professional background
172. See Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill I), 416 F.3d 320, 325 (4th Cir. 2005) (referencing Kristof’s May 24, 2002 article about “Mr. Z,” soon to be exposed as Hatfill in a subsequent August 2002 op-ed after the FBI’s investigation focused on Hatfill more intently).
Not until after Kristof’s early anthrax op-eds did media and law enforcement attention
focus more significantly on Hatfill’s potential involvement in the anthrax attacks. See
Marilyn W. Thompson, The Persuit [sic] of Steven Hatfill, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2003 (Magazine), at W06 (describing how the FBI’s investigation of Hatfill increased dramatically during the summer of 2002 after the Times had begun publishing the Kristof op-ed articles); see
also Brief of the Appellant, supra note 163, at 28–31 (describing in detail the extent of
Hatfill’s media contacts before Kristof started publishing his op-eds).
Additionally, as demonstrated in Foretich, certain defensive media responses may not
be included in the Fitzgerald test analysis. See Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d
1541, 1558 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e are extremely reluctant to attribute public-figure status
to otherwise private persons merely because they have responded to . . . accusations in a
reasonable attempt to vindicate their reputations.”). In Foretich, the court weighed the
potential threat to one’s reputation resulting from the gravity of juvenile sexual assault
accusations, and precluded defensive media appearances from serving as evidence of the
grandparents’ public figure status. Id. at 1558–59, 1563. In Hatfill’s case, Kristof’s insinuations and inferences suggested that Hatfill may have been a domestic terrorist at a time
when America was living in fear of the September 11th attacks. See Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at
315 (describing the general fear that resulted from the post-September 11th anthrax attacks). Such inferences might have carried the same weight as accusations of juvenile sexual assault and, if so, the first Fitzgerald test should not have included consideration of the
several defensive media appearances Hatfill made after Kristof’s articles damaged Hatfill’s
reputation. See Scott Shane, Anthrax Figure Steps Up Offense, BALT. SUN, Aug. 26, 2002, at 1A
(describing Hatfill’s summer news conferences in which Hatfill strongly criticized Kristof,
the Attorney General of the United States, and the FBI). Compare Foretich, 37 F.3d at 1558,
1563 (precluding the use of the defamation-plaintiffs’ media interactions in the Fitzgerald
test analysis), with Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 322 (accepting all of the defamation-plaintiff’s
media interactions as relevant to the second and third Fitzgerald factors). Moreover, even
though defensive responses may be “‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,’” Foretich, 37
F.3d at 1560 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)), the Hatfill III
court never addressed whether Hatfill’s public replies were excludable. See Hatfill III, 532
F.3d at 322 (referring to Hatfill’s defensive press conferences as evidence of his access to
media); see also Mowbray, supra note 13 (describing Hatfill’s defensive responses to media
accusations, specifically Kristof’s, suggesting Hatfill was involved in the 2001 anthrax
attacks).
173. See Brief of the Appellant, supra note 163, at 24–25 (explaining how the lower court
similarly misapplied the second and third Fitzgerald test factors by basing the analysis on an
overly broad scope of the particular public controversy); see also supra notes 155–156 and
accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 132–133 and accompanying text (describing Judge Niemeyer’s discussion of the broad public controversy at issue in Hatfill’s case).
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and media exposure, both related and unrelated to the 2001 anthrax
attacks, before defining the particular controversy, the court created
momentum for its eventual finding that Kristof’s articles broadly covered “the debate on the threat from bioterrorism and the nation’s
lack of preparation for it,”175 rather than simply the FBI’s investigation of the 2001 anthrax terrorist suspects.176 With such a broad
scope, the court improperly included Hatfill’s entire professional
background as evidence of his influence and prominence on issues
related to the risk that bioterrorism posed to America’s national security.177 Indeed, the broadened scope served as a death-knell to Hatfill’s
claim.178
B. The Misapplication of the Circuit’s Two-Part Inquiry Threatens
Private Citizens’ Ability to Redress Media Attacks on Their
Reputations
The limited-purpose public figure doctrine developed as the Supreme Court sought to evaluate defamation cases in which a plaintiff
did not quite qualify as a public official yet seemed to function in a
more prominent role than that of a private citizen.179 In attempting
to strike a judicial balance between private individuals’ active involvement in prominent affairs and private citizens’ lessened ability to defend against public attacks, the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit
have warned repeatedly of the threat to private citizens should they be
175. Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 322.
176. Cf. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979) (noting that broad classifications of public controversies may “‘too often result in an improper balance between the
competing interests’” of informed public debate and private citizens’ right to protect their
reputation) (quoting Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456 (1976)).
177. Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 323–24. The court cites as examples of Hatfill’s influence in
the “controversy” his prior “lectures, writings, participation on panels, and interviews.” Id.
at 324. However, the Court in Hutchinson specifically rejected a similar attempt to replace a
narrow controversy with a more generalized concept. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135. In that
case, the Court denied the relevance of a researcher’s professional experience in his scientific field as evidence of his special prominence or effort to influence the outcome of the
particular controversy which had given rise to the defamation claim. Id.
178. See Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 324 (qualifying Hatfill as a limited-purpose public figure
and requiring him to meet the heightened “actual malice” standard).
179. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (creating a judicial standard that applied to non-elected individuals’ actions whose influence affects public outcomes); see also supra note 166 and accompanying text (describing the purpose of the
“actual malice” standard and the limited-purpose public figure doctrine). Prior to Gertz,
the Court in New York Times had expanded First Amendment protections without clear
limits on the privilege’s application. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80
(1964) (announcing the “actual malice” standard for public officials, yet not limiting the
new standard’s application).

R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-3\MLR306.txt

750

unknown

Seq: 27

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

21-APR-09

11:12

[VOL. 68:724

subjected to an “actual malice” standard inappropriately.180 Additionally, harms caused to private citizens by the negligent reporting of
prominent events can be incredibly detrimental not only to a private
citizen’s reputation but also to the private citizen’s emotional and
physical well-being.181 Since New York Times and Gertz, the Supreme
Court has backtracked on its application of the “actual malice” standard and has reaffirmed lower courts’ need to protect private citizens
from defamatory statements.182 Nevertheless, in contrast to the Su180. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348–49 (“[W]e endorse [the limited-purpose public figure standard] in recognition of the strong and legitimate state interest in compensating
private individuals for injury to reputation.”); see also Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130, 147–48 (1967) (referencing the importance of protecting private persons’ reputations
in the context of the development of libel law); Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37
F.3d 1541, 1552 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[P]ublic figures are less deserving of protection than
private individuals because public figures, like public officials, have voluntarily exposed
themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood.”).
181. See Richards, supra note 167, at 479 (describing the practical effect of an overly
broad application of the limited-purpose public figure doctrine on defamation-plaintiffs
who otherwise may have qualified as private citizens). The 2001 anthrax attacks investigations and subsequent media reporting had extremely detrimental effects on an incredibly
large number of innocent individuals caught in the midst of the controversy. See, e.g.,
William J. Broad & Scott Shane, For Suspects, Anthrax Case Had Big Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
2008, at A01 (outlining the social costs to over eight innocent suspects whose involvement
in the anthrax investigation seemingly led to social outcast, unemployment, alcoholism,
paranoia, divorce, and suicide); Doug Donovan, Death Brings Questions: Apparent Suicide of
Anthrax Suspect Challenges Role of Leaks in Probes, BALT. SUN, Aug. 2, 2008, at 5A (reporting
on the likely role of the investigations in the apparent suicide of Dr. Bruce Ivins, another
bioterrorism researcher connected to the anthrax virus and national security preparedness). Furthermore, beyond the anthrax investigations, negligent reporting on private citizens involved in government investigations has taken a significant toll on other individuals
who have been wrongly associated with publicized crimes. See Richards, supra note 167, at
494–96 (explaining the life-long negative consequences for Richard Jewell, one-time suspect of the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games bombing, of his portrayal in the news media as
having committed the act of terrorism); see also Steve Chapman, The News Media vs. the
Innocent, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 27, 2008, at 19 (chiding the news media for overstepping its role
of informing the public and in turn ruining private citizens’ lives as a consequence); Ted
Gup, Gotcha; You May or May Not Be a Suspect, But You Will Be All Over the News, WASH. POST,
Aug. 18, 2002, at B01 (warning against recent tendancies in the news industry to report on
criminal suspects before fully considering the implications of publicly labeling individuals
“persons of interest” or “suspects”).
182. See Richards, supra note 167, at 479–80 (arguing that lower courts’ application of
the limited-purpose public figure doctrine does not align with post-Gertz Supreme Court
opinions and has blurred the line between general-purpose, limited-purpose, and involuntary public figures); see, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134–35 (1979) (explaining that a private individual does not automatically become a public figure once he or
she has received public funds); Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 167
(1979) (denying that a private individual immediately qualifies as a limited-purpose public
figure merely because he or she is involved in public judicial proceedings); Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453–54 (1976) (strengthening the requirement that even a prominent member of society does not automatically qualify as a limited-purpose public figure;
rather, to qualify she must thrust herself into a controversy publicly for the purpose of
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preme Court’s general trend towards increasing protection of private
citizens, the Hatfill III court permitted an expansive definition of the
particular controversy to serve as the foundation of the public figure
doctrine’s analysis merely because the op-ed series’s author briefly
considered how national security may have been impacted.183
The Hatfill III court’s analysis seemingly extinguishes the purposeful delineation between the general-purpose and limited-purpose
public figure doctrines whenever national security is a tangential issue
of a more specifically centered media report.184 Purposely defining
resolving it). Additionally, prominent practitioner Lin Wood describes cases in which the
practical misapplication of the heightened “actual malice” standard has caused severe
hardship for his prior clients, including Richard Jewell, Gary Condit, and the parents of
JonBenét Ramsey. Richards, supra note 167, at 470, 483, 495.
183. See Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 323 (referring to the broader issues of national security
and bioterrorism preparedness with the FBI’s investigation of the anthrax attacker as an
example).
184. Judge Niemeyer’s generous assumption that the social interest involved in Kristof’s
reporting on the failed anthrax attack investigations seems to resemble the overruled holding of Rosenbloom in which the Supreme Court proposed the use of the “public or general
interest” test to apply the “actual malice” standard. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29, 43–44 (1971) (plurality opinion), overruled by Gertz, 418 U.S. 323. Moreover, in
Gertz, the Court explicitly warned of the negative repercussions of adopting such a standard. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (“[A] private individual whose reputation is injured by
defamatory falsehood that does concern an issue of public or general interest has no recourse unless he can meet the rigorous requirements of [the ‘actual malice’ standard].”).
By reading into Kristof’s articles a national concern for the threat of bioterrorism on
national security preparedness, the Fourth Circuit degrades the purpose of defining a particular public controversy and seemingly reverts to an overruled Rosenbloom analysis, weakening the purposeful development of the limited-purpose public figure doctrine. See
Hatfill III, 532 F.3d at 323 (discussing the “broader” issue encompassing the larger context
of the articles); see also Brief of the Appellant, supra note 163, at 25–27 (outlining the faults
of defining an overly broad controversy). Such an approach threatens the right of states to
use defamation laws to protect private citizens who may be involved in industries related to
the country’s preparedness against terrorist attacks. These citizens’ professions inherently
involve national security and any investigation relating to their employment likely would be
viewed as connected to a broader national security interest, particularly if, for example, a
reporter briefly mentions a potential threat to national security in a media report. Cf.
Richards, supra note 167, at 488–89 (arguing that the “24/7” news channels and the Internet create a media atmosphere that demands instantaneous reporting at the cost of
previously strict and appropriate self-regulation by the media).
Moreover, the Hatfill III court’s limited-purpose public figure analysis certainly will
affect subsequent defamation cases brought in the Fourth Circuit, such as Vicki Iseman’s
recently-filed lawsuit against the Times. In her complaint, Iseman alleges that, during the
2008 presidential campaign, the Times defamed her by erroneously reporting on “an illicit
‘romantic’ and unethical relationship in breach of the public trust in 1999” between her
and Senator John McCain. Complaint at 1, Iseman v. New York Times Co., No. 3:08CV848
(E.D. Vir. Dec. 30, 2008). Had the parties not reached a settlement, the Hatfill III court’s
broadened analysis may have permitted the Times to include Iseman’s mere association
with a presidential candidate as trial evidence of Iseman’s limited-purpose public figure
status, as a presidential candidate’s associates are tangentially related to the candidate’s
approach to national security. See Ashby Jones, Vicki Iseman: Is She a Public or Private Figure?,
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the scope of the controversy is critical for courts to appropriately qualify a plaintiff as a limited-purpose public figure.185 When the scope of
the controversy is defined too broadly, a court may unfairly burden a
private citizen’s defamation claim by labeling private events as public.186 A court could erroneously determine that a private citizen’s
participation in “newsworthy” events were public merely because the
media covered the events widely.187 An overbroad scope may cause a
court to determine incorrectly that a prominent individual qualifies as
a limited-purpose public figure because of his or her public pedigree
or status in society not related to the public controversy.188 An overly
expansive controversy also may lead a Fourth Circuit court to misinterpret the Fitzgerald test by including evidence of extraneous media interactions in the limited-purpose public figure determination.189
WALL ST. JOURNAL’S LAW BLOG, Jan. 23, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/12/31/
vicki-iseman-is-she-a-public-or-private-figure/ (reporting an interview with prominent First
Amendment scholar and professor Clay Calvert about Iseman’s key legal issue, whether or
not her actions as a lobbyist or her association with Senator John McCain should qualify
her as a limited-purpose public figure); see also Ashby Jones, A Law Blog Conversation with
Vicki Iseman, WALL ST. JOURNAL’S LAW BLOG, Feb. 20, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/
2009/02/20/a-law-blog-conversation-with-vicki-iseman/ (discussing Iseman’s dissatisfaction with the Times’ allegedly contradictory public statements made after the parties had
reached a settlement agreement).
185. See Foretich, 37 F.3d at 1556–57 (evaluating Time, Inc. v. Firestone to define the scope
of the particular controversy cautiously and to avoid an erroneous inclusion of a plaintiff’s
actions which were not directly related to the particular public controversy).
186. See, e.g., Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135 (explaining the danger of using the subject
matter of the controversy as the deciding factor in determining whether to apply the limited-purpose public figure doctrine for fear of over-burdening private citizens); Firestone,
424 U.S. at 455–56 (holding that although judicial proceedings eventually become a matter of public record, the events giving rise to the proceedings do not necessarily trigger an
automatic public controversy classification). The Court in Firestone also explicitly noted
that courts should be extremely mindful of granting undue protection to defamation-defendants when private citizens’ reputations would come as a significant cost in the balance
between constitutional and individual rights. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 456.
187. See, e.g., Wolston 443 U.S. at 167 (referencing the Court’s overruling of Rosenbloom to
affirm that courts should evaluate private individuals’ active participation in a series of
events to determine whether they qualify as limited-purpose public figures, rather than
evaluating the nature of the events themselves).
188. See, e.g., Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454 (arguing that social status should not necessarily
influence whether a court should apply the limited-purpose public figure classification to
defamation-plaintiffs). But see id. at 481 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that fully informed debate requires courts to enforce the heightened “actual malice” standard against
nearly all defamation-plaintiffs who bring claims against the media to prevent harmful selfcensorship).
189. See, e.g., Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 537 (4th Cir. 1999) (excluding examples of a
defamation-plaintiff’s several interactions with the media from the Fitzgerald test because
some instances qualified as reasonable responses to reputation-injuring statements and
other instances were made without the plaintiff’s intention to impact the resolution of the
controversy).
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Finally, an overly broad controversy may influence a court to misinterpret a defamation-plaintiff’s self-help, defensive actions against serious
criminal charges as an attempt by the plaintiff to influence the outcome of the controversy.190
By broadening the scope of the particular public controversy, the
Hatfill III court followed an inappropriate trend of judicial deference
to an overly expansive First Amendment protection of media outlets.191 The outcome in Hatfill III may have been significantly different had Judge Niemeyer applied the Circuit’s two-part inquiry strictly
to limit the scope of evidence available for the Fitzgerald test, and
thereby limiting the particular public controversy to the direct context
present in all of Kristof’s anthrax-related articles published between
May and August 2002.192 As the court stated in Hatfill III, the five
Kristof op-ed articles gradually introduced more evidence that suggested that Hatfill was the FBI’s prime suspect; provided greater rationale behind Hatfill’s ability and motive to weaponize anthrax; and,
finally, admonished the FBI for failing to act quickly to determine
Hatfill’s involvement in the 2001 attacks.193 The subject matter of the
articles was not absolutely clear and, beginning with its disorganized
application of the Fourth Circuit’s two-part limited-purpose public figure inquiry, the court chose to focus on the broadest interpretation
available.194 By adopting the Times’ approach, the Hatfill III court
190. But see Foretich, 37 F.3d at 1558 (excluding the Foretiches’ public appearances from
the Fitzgerald test analysis and withholding their media appearances from the court’s evaluation of the Foretiches’ involvement in the controversy because the appearances served as
reasonable attempts to defend against serious charges of juvenile sexual assault).
191. See Richards, supra note 167, at 480–81 (discussing judges’ unfamiliarity with defamation law and courts’ general preference for deferring to media claims that the free press
will be hampered by not applying the “actual malice” standard to defamation-plaintiffs);
accord Heidee Stoller et al., Developments in Law and Policy: The Costs of Post-9/11 National
Security Strategy, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 197, 224, 227–31 (2004) (evaluating judicial trends
in the Second, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits on issues related to terrorism to suggest that courts
can become overly deferential to parties that claim to act on behalf of national security to
justify their actions).
192. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (explaining how Hatfill’s public exposure may not have been relevant to the scope of a more narrow controversy).
193. See Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co. (Hatfill III), 532 F.3d 312, 315 (4th Cir.) (providing a
summary of the major themes of Kristof’s op-eds involving Hatfill’s relation to the FBI’s
anthrax investigations), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 765 (2008).
194. Not surprisingly, this was also the approach urged by the Times’ legal team. See
Brief of Appellee at 43–46, Hatfill III, 532 F.3d 312 (Nos. 07-1124, 07-1162) (arguing for
the most expansive interpretation of the controversy at issue in relation to Kristof’s articles,
taken as a whole); see also Brief of Amici Curiae ABC, Inc. et al. in Support of Appellee the
New York Times Company at 14–19, Hatfill III, 532 F.3d 312 (No. 07-1124) (supporting the
Times’ position that an expansive interpretation of the scope of the particular controversy
was necessary to avoid media self-censorship); Jerry Markon, N.Y. Times Urges Judge to Dismiss Hatfill Suit, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2007, at A06 (reporting on the Times’ position that

R

R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-3\MLR306.txt

754

unknown

Seq: 31

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

21-APR-09

11:12

[VOL. 68:724

gave credence to a retroactive application of the limited-purpose public figure doctrine, widened the scope of relevant controversies that
may expose private citizens to the limited-purpose public figure classification, and weakened states’ abilities to use defamation laws to protect certain private citizens from negligent media reports.195
V.

CONCLUSION

In Hatfill v. New York Times Co. (Hatfill III), the Fourth Circuit
used the limited-purpose public figure doctrine as the basis to dismiss
a defamation suit brought by an individual against a major news outlet.196 The court’s opinion questionably expanded the developing requirement for defamation-plaintiffs who may be required to meet a
heightened “actual malice” standard.197 Specifically, the court widened the scope of the particular public controversy at issue by misapplying the Circuit’s two-part inquiry,198 which led to a flawed use of
the Fitzgerald test.199 As a result, future defamation-plaintiffs involved
professionally in national security fields may face a more difficult burden to succeed in defamation claims against media outlets reporting
on suspects involved in government investigations.200

“[t]he larger issue in the columns was the nation’s preparedness to handle biological
attacks”).
195. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
196. See supra Part III.
197. See supra Part IV.A.
198. See supra Part II.
199. See supra Part IV.A.
200. See supra Part IV.B.
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